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ESSAY
REGULATION AND DEREGULATION: THE BASELINE
CHALLENGE
Kathryn Judge*
INTRODUCTION
What does it mean to deregulate? Is deregulation just about the repeal
of existing rules? In a closed and static system, this definition seems apt.
But what if the bounds are porous? Or the internal workings of the
system are dynamic? Once a system is structured to allow the option set
to change, do the proscriptions embedded in law at Time A remain the
appropriate baseline? Or should the baseline evolve, recreating the
balance struck at Time A given the option set that exists at Time B?
What if the reasons for the balance struck at Time A are myriad, and
drawing a line at Time B requires some values to be sacrificed to protect
others? What if jurisdictional or other logistical challenges preclude
replicating Time A’s line at Time B? Is the expectation of such
challenges a reason to limit dynamism? Should it matter whether the
innovations underlying the dynamism enhance welfare in ways unrelated
to the regulatory regime?
These questions are core to Professor Paul Mahoney’s thoughtful
critique of the deregulation hypothesis, that is, the claim that the 2007–
2009 financial crisis was a byproduct of deregulation in the period
leading up to it.1 They also illuminate why the debate over the
* Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.
1

Paul G. Mahoney, Deregulation and the Subprime Crisis, 104 Va. L. Rev. 233, 236
(2018).
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deregulation hypothesis remains important. The issue is not just about
allocating blame for a crisis that erupted a decade ago, though there is
plenty of that in these discussions. Nor can the conflicting views on the
deregulation hypothesis be reduced to one’s priors about whether the
government or the market is to blame when things go wrong, though
these predispositions too trickle in. Rather, the important and contested
question at the core of the ongoing debate about the role of deregulation
in contributing to the financial crisis is what it means to regulate.
Advocates of the deregulation hypothesis typically highlight the ways
that finance changed in the decades leading up to the crisis. Gone, or at
least radically diminished, are the small, boring banks that dominated
the U.S. landscape for most of the twentieth century. The three decades
leading up to the crisis witnessed a dramatic rise in the concentration of
banking assets among a small number of ever larger and more complex
banking organizations.2 At the same time, thanks to the rise of
securitization and derivatives, financial instruments and the markets in
which they traded became increasingly complex, interconnected, and
opaque.
Prominent legal academics, like Professors Lynn Stout and Arthur
Wilmarth, and economists, like Professors Simon Johnson and Joe
Stiglitz, view these changes as central to the crisis and as byproducts, at
least in part, of deregulatory maneuvers in the decades before the crisis.3
Mahoney’s rebuttal does not deny these radical changes, but rather
emphasizes that many of these developments, and the dramatic increase
in the issuance of subprime mortgages, would likely have occurred even
without Congress smoothing the way for commercial banks to engage in
investment banking and for derivatives to spread unregulated.4 His
account instead places the emphasis on innovation, spurred by
macroeconomic developments that undermined the viability of the small
commercial banks and thrifts, in contributing to these changes.5
2
Jeffrey N. Gordon & Kathryn Judge, The Origins of a Capital Market Union in the
United States 9 (Columbia Law Sch. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working Paper No. 584,
2018), https://perma.cc/8EZS-LZM6.
3
See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis, 1
Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 1, 1–5 (2011); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Road to Repeal of the GlassSteagall Act, 17 Wake Forest J. Bus. & Intell. Prop. L. 441, 444 (2017); Simon Johnson, The
Quiet Coup, The Atlantic (May 2009), https://perma.cc/YEE3-3W67; Joseph E. Stiglitz,
Capitalist Fools, Vanity Fair Hive (Dec. 9, 2008), https://perma.cc/QEN3-UKKV.
4
Mahoney, supra note 1, at 236–37.
5
Id. at 286–89.
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The two sides in this debate are thus effectively talking past each
other. Mahoney shows that subprime lending and securitization were
already allowed;6 defenders of the deregulation hypothesis argue that the
expansion of banks into trading and other investment banking activities
fundamentally altered their risk appetites and culture in ways that were
critical to the excesses that followed.7 Mahoney focuses on the state of
the law just before Congress adopted the two critical acts;8
deregulation’s critics view these acts of Congress as emblematic of an
overall deregulatory posture that also pervaded regulators and courts,
and thus degraded the law even before Congress intervened.9 He argues
that competitive pressures from new innovations and high inflation
undermined the viability of the old model of banking;10 they view the
decision to allow such innovation as further evidence of an overall
deregulatory stance and a failure to fully enforce the spirit of laws meant
to keep banking boring.11
The difficult truth is that both sides are right. Mahoney’s core
contribution is to reveal the danger of nostalgia. Finance, at least in the
United States, has long been dynamic, responsive to regulation and
macroeconomic developments alike. The stability the United States
enjoyed for much of the twentieth century was due both to repressive
regulation and a favorable macroeconomic climate. Reinstituting the
former would not necessarily bring about the latter, and might well just
invite greater gamesmanship. We forget this at our peril.
At the same time, critics of deregulation and others are drawing
attention to the importance of understanding the myriad mechanisms
through which law shapes the structure and resilience of the financial

6

Id. at 252.
E.g., Stiglitz, supra note 3 (“The most important consequence of the repeal of GlassSteagall was indirect – it lay in the way repeal changed an entire culture.”).
8
Mahoney, supra note 1, at 252–53, 265–70.
9
See, e.g., Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the U.S.
Financial Industry: 1909-2006, 127 Q J. Econ. 1551, 1578 fig.8 (2012) (developing a
deregulation index and showing that over the past century, deregulation increased starting in
the 1970s and continuing virtually unabated until leveling off a few years before the crisis at
a higher level of deregulation than at any point in the preceding century); Wilmarth, supra
note 3, at 491.
10
Mahoney, supra note 1, at 237.
11
See, e.g., Stout, supra note 3, at 1–5; Stiglitz, supra note 3 (“As we stripped back the old
regulations, we did nothing to address the new challenges posed by 21st-century markets.”).
7
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system.12 Laying the demise of the twentieth century Quiet Period
entirely at the feet of macroeconomics and market forces without
acknowledging the way the law contributed to changes in the
competitive playing field could lead to similarly misguided policy
prescriptions.
That this dialogue is framed as a fundamental disagreement about
deregulation reveals very different understandings regarding the initial
balances struck in the regimes that were subsequently changed. There is,
in short, no agreement about the correct baseline. To simplify:
Defenders of the deregulation hypothesis implicitly assume that the law
should evolve to protect the fundamental values it protected at Time A
or it should find a way to outlaw change. It is spirit, not substance, that
counts. When an environment is dynamic, even static rules can be
deregulatory in effect. In contrast, Mahoney and critics of the
deregulation hypothesis assume that the law as written at Time A
remains the relevant baseline at Time B, regardless of the changes that
have occurred or the reasons for those changes. The debate about
deregulation matters today not because it reveals a fundamental tension
between a static legal regime and a dynamic environment. Determining
when a change in the law is merely updating the rules of the game to
maintain the status quo in a new environment, or is instead changing the
rules of the game, has important implications for the type of processes
that ought to accompany the action. Digging into the baseline problem
further reveals how failures to update the law can also be deregulatory in
effect, and thus might merit closer scrutiny than such inaction often
receives.
Given the broad range of issues addressed by Mahoney and advocates
of the deregulation hypothesis, this Essay will not try to tackle them all.
Rather, it uses the disintegration of the Glass–Steagall divide between
investment and commercial banks ––what steps along this path are
appropriately characterized as deregulatory and the myriad rationales for
this type of structural separation––to illuminate the core tensions. This
focus is also quite relevant to policy debates today, as there is now a
12
Stout, supra note 3, at 3–4; Wilmarth, supra note 3, at 443–45; see also Jeffrey N.
Gordon, The Empty Call for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Financial Regulation, 43 J. Legal
Stud. S351 (2014); Kathryn Judge, Investor-Driven Financial Innovation, 7 Harv. Bus. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2018) [hereinafter Judge, Investor-Driven Financial Innovation];
Katharina Pistor, A Legal Theory of Finance, 41 J. Comp. Econ. 315 (2013); Gordon &
Judge, supra note 2.
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renewed interest in structural divides of the type embodied in Glass–
Steagall, both within banking and beyond. The Essay concludes with
some thoughts about how financial regulation can best incorporate the
insights from both sides of this debate.
I. WHAT IT MEANS TO DEREGULATE
The rise of money market mutual funds as a competitor for banks
provides a nice starting point for thinking through the challenge of
disentangling deregulation from changes external to the regulatory
regime. In a Section titled, “Market Forces and the End of Interest Rate
Caps,” Mahoney provides a now-familiar account of the ways the rise of
interest rates in the 1970s strained banks along numerous dimensions.13
A core challenge was how to hold on to deposits. Until that time, Glass–
Steagall limited the interest rate a bank could pay on deposits. This was
embodied in Regulation Q.14 This was but one element of an overall
repressive financial regime. One way of understanding Glass–Steagall
(and there are many)15 is that it simultaneously handicapped and
advantaged commercial banks and thrifts, on the one hand, and
investment banks, on the other, by providing each domains where they
were effectively free from competition from the other.16 As a result of a
mixture of state and federal laws, for much of the twentieth century,
banks were small, local enterprises that compensated for shortcomings
in scale and scope by dominating the domains where they were active.17
Most importantly, banks dominated the issuance of private moneylike assets.18 Recent empirical literature demonstrates the strong demand
for these types of assets, as evidenced by investors’ willingness to pay a
premium for financial instruments that have some degree of

13

Mahoney, supra note 1, at 286.
12 C.F.R. § 217.1 (2010). Regulation Q’s prohibition on interest-bearing demand
deposit accounts was effectively repealed by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 627, 124 Stat. 1640 (2010).
15
See infra Part III.
16
Gordon & Judge, supra note 2, at 15–16.
17
Id. at 12.
18
Gary Gorton, Misunderstanding Financial Crises: Why We Don’t See Them Coming
10–28 (2012). For more background on what constitutes “money” for these purposes, see
Morgan Ricks, The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation 30–40 (2016);
Kathryn Judge, The Importance of “Money,” 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1148, 1154–55 (2017)
(reviewing Morgan Ricks, The Money Problem: Rethinking Financial Regulation (2016))
[hereinafter Judge, Importance of Money].
14
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“moneyness.”19 Thus, although Regulation Q helped reduce competition
among banks, it was banks’ status as the primary source of private
money that was key to allowing them to attract and retain deposits while
paying relatively little, and often no, interest on those accounts. This was
critical to the profitability of banks, which at the time was largely the
difference between the interest they earned on outstanding loans and the
interest they paid to depositors. As Professor Gary Gorton, among
others, has argued, the profitability enabled by cheap financing made
bank charters valuable and bank owners risk averse. This is a key factor,
even if not the only one, in helping to explain the Quiet Period.
The introduction of money market mutual funds, which Mahoney
aptly describes as “an attractive and intuitive alternative to checkable
bank deposits,”20 was thus a watershed moment in “financial structure
law”—one that fundamentally disrupted a core component of a regime
that had allowed small, boring banks to thrive.21 The challenge, for both
Mahoney and those who advocate the deregulation hypothesis, is that
the decline in bank charter value, and the increased competition banks
faced on numerous dimensions, is overdetermined.22
Mahoney’s focus is on the challenge posed by soaring interest rates.
In an environment with money market mutual funds, that is, in an
environment where firms and individuals could get a more competitive
interest rate, without sacrificing the “moneyness” they held dear, it was
extremely challenging for banks to retain sufficient deposits and comply
with Regulation Q.23 Mahoney explains how banks fought back,
developing a new form of account meant to compete with money market
mutual funds, and how Congress allowed banks to experiment and
innovate to stave off this new form of competition.24 But in his account,
the rise of money market mutual funds was antecedent to, rather than

19
Arvind Krishnamurthy & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, The Aggregate Demand for
Treasury Debt, 120 J. Pol. Econ. 233, 258 (2012) (finding a monetary premium that
averaged 73 basis points per year between 1926 and 2008).
20
Mahoney, supra note 1, at 286.
21
Gordon & Judge, supra note 2, at 3.
22
For a thoughtful account suggesting that the costs of allowing money market mutual
funds to compete for bank deposits was revealed only slowly, over time, see Gordon, supra
note 12, at S360–66 (2014).
23
Mahoney, supra note 1, at 237–38.
24
Id. at 287.
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part of, the deregulatory modus operandi that preceded the 2007–2009
financial crisis.25
One could just as easily spin a very different narrative from the same
set of developments by emphasizing the myriad ways that regulators
paved the way to allow nonbanks to issue private money. The most
obvious way that regulators helped money market mutual funds become
direct competitors for bank deposits was the decision by the Securities
and Exchange Commission allowing these funds to use a net asset value
(NAV) of $1.00, even when the value of the underlying assets
fluctuated, making shares more money-like.26 But other actors also
played a role. States, for example, have long prohibited nonbanks from
engaging in the business of banking27 and frequently take the position
that accepting deposits is a defining feature of banking.28 Although some
states challenged money market mutual funds and the suite of services
that investment banks increasingly offered in conjunction with such
funds, none ultimately prevented the spread of the funds.29
Most relevant, given Mahoney’s framing, is the question of whether
the issuance of money market mutual funds violated the Glass–Steagall
separation of investment and commercial banking. Many contemporaries
thought so. As James Butera explained at the time,
Glass–Steagall is a two way street in that it not only restricts the
securities activities of commercial banks, but circumscribes as well the
bank-like activities of securities firms. In particular, Section 21 of the

25

Id. at 280–82.
See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (1984). The importance of the $1.00 NAV to the success of
money market funds as a substitute for deposits has been brought home recently by changes
to Rule 2a-7, which now requires that money market mutual funds holding non-government
debt and issued to institutional holders use a floating NAV. See U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Rule 2a-7 Amendments Adopted by SEC in July 2014 Marked to Show Changes from
Previous Rule 2a-7 (2014), https://perma.cc/YTS9-BEKF. The net effect has been a massive
decline in the money market mutual funds forced to use the floating NAV. Catherine Chen et
al., Money Market Funds and the New SEC Regulation, Fed. Res. Bank N.Y.: Liberty Street
Econ. (Mar. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/DRZ9-LUWX (finding that “the prime and muni
segment of the MMF industry,” which is the segment of the market forced to use floating
NAV, “ha[s] fallen by more than half,” losing $1.1 trillion in assets, as a result of the rule
change).
27
Michael S. Barr, Howell E. Jackson, & Margaret E. Tahyar, Financial Regulation: Law
and Policy 101–03 (2016).
28
John A. Adams, Money Market Mutual Funds: Has Glass-Steagall Been Cracked?, 99
Banking L.J. 4, 21–22 (1982).
29
Barr et al., supra note 27, at 1201–02.
26
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Act prohibits a securities firm [and the like] . . .from engaging . . . ‘to
any extent whatever in the business of receiving deposits.’30
John Adams similarly opined at the time that regardless of the
normative questions of whether money market mutual funds should be
allowed, allowing money market mutual funds to use a $1.00 NAV, and
provide features like check writing and free credit balances crossed the
line at the heart of the Glass–Steagall regime.31 Paul Volcker, then at the
Federal Reserve, recalls readily recognizing money market mutual funds
as “a clear instance of regulatory arbitrage,”; in his view, they were a
product specifically designed to “skirt banking regulations.”32
Ultimately, the Justice Department decided that money market mutual
funds were permissible and Congress decided not to adopt proposed
legislation that would have subjected money market mutual funds to
reserve requirements akin to those imposed on banks. But that the entry
of these funds disrupted the Glass–Steagall balance was quite clear even
at the time.33
This version suggests that the growth of money market mutual funds,
in forms that made them ready substitutes for bank deposits, was not
external or antecedent to the tearing down of the Glass–Steagall wall but
in fact core to that process. Putting these two stories alongside each
other shows why Gorton (among many others) is of the view that
“competition and deregulation” worked together to undermine bank
profitability during this period.34
II. WHY THE CHARACTERIZATION MATTERS
When one moves from the details to the bigger picture, there are
important commonalities in the various depictions of the three decades
leading up to the crisis. Most recognize that innovation and
macroeconomic developments strained a repressive regulatory regime
that had given both banks and investment banks domains in which they
could flourish largely protected from competition by the other. And
there is general agreement that in response to these developments,
30

Id. at 1201–03 (quoting James J. Butera, Money Market Mutual Funds: The Legal and
Regulatory Background, 28 Fed. B. News 91, 92 (1981)).
31
Adams, supra note 28, at 9–11.
32
Barr et al., supra note 27, at 1203 (quoting Letter from Paul Volcker to SEC concerning
Release No. IC-29497 (Feb. 11, 2011), https://perma.cc/DYK3-DXEG).
33
Id. at 1203–04.
34
Gorton, supra note 18, at 128 (emphasis added).
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Congress and regulators faced a choice: double down on that regime or
move away from it. They chose the latter. But despite this level of
agreement, the narratives each side tells remain quite different.
Mahoney grounds the end of the Quiet Period in a macroeconomic
climate that virtually ensured the demise of the particular model of
banking that pervaded during the Quiet Period. As he rightly points out,
the increasingly global nature of financial markets during this time
further undermined the oligopoly local banks once enjoyed over the
process of private money creation, and investors may have been willing
at times to hold non-money-like assets in lieu of bank deposits if the
costs of deposits was too dear.35 Other innovations, from sale and
repurchase agreements to asset-backed commercial paper, would likely
have undermined banks’ monopoly over private money creation even
without the advent of money market mutual funds unless the repressive
dimensions of the prior regime had been expanded significantly.
Mahoney’s account thus successfully casts doubt on the viability of any
effort to try to recreate the Quiet Period by reintroducing a far more
repressive approach to financial regulation and money creation.36
Just as importantly, even when it succeeded in bringing about
stability, the structural limitations imposed on banks and other types of
financial institutions in the United States had real costs.37 Mahoney’s
account provides an important reminder that, when undertaking financial
structure law, lawmakers’ options are inherently constrained by the
building materials and macroeconomic conditions they are facing.
Attempts to shape the financial markets without understanding those
constraints can bring about unintended consequences that run counter to
desired aims.38

35

Mahoney, supra note 1, at 259–62.
See William D. Cohan, Bring Back Glass-Steagall? Goldman Sachs Would Love That,
N.Y. Times (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/21/business/dealbook/bringback-glass-steagall-goldman-sachs-would-love-that.html; Matt Egan, Trump Wants to
Revive a 1933 Banking Law. What That Means is Very Unclear, CNN Money (May 9, 2017
2:42 PM), https://perma.cc/79K9-7AVR.
37
See Charles W. Calomiris & Stephen H. Haber, Fragile By Design: The Political
Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit (2014); Mark Roe, Strong Managers, Weak
Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance 95–101 (1994).
38
E.g., Judge, Investor-Driven Financial Innovation, supra note 12 (showing how legal
interventions can prompt destabilizing financial innovations, and arguing that regulators
should take a more systemic and structural approach to rulemaking to minimize such
ramifications).
36
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At the same time, something is lost in the refusal to recognize the
regulatory decisions and legislative failures to act that contributed to the
erosion of a powerful structural separation as part of (rather than merely
antecedent to) deregulation. It is precisely because macroeconomic
developments and innovation can be expected to test and push against
the balance struck in any financial regulatory regime that a theory of
deregulation that focuses solely on major repeals by Congress misses the
boat. Absent static conditions, even static rules can be deregulatory in
effect. This is particularly true in finance, where so much innovation
entails efforts to replicate a regulated activity in a form that is just
outside the regulatory perimeter.
This is the baseline problem. In a static world, Mahoney’s definition
suffices. But as he himself emphasizes, financial markets are neither
static nor closed, and he is not suggesting that they ought to be. Whether
to characterize the actions facilitating the growth of money market funds
as deregulatory matters because deregulation implies a change in the
existing regulatory regime. Just as importantly, the conflicting views of
how best to characterize the actions and inactions that allowed money
market funds to flourish suggests very different views of how best to
characterize the hypothetical alternative path in which regulators had
sought to protect banks’ control over private money creation.
The United States legal system rests on the assumption that changing
the law is different than updating the law to address new circumstances.
Changes in the law generally require approval by both Houses of
Congress and the President. In contrast, applying existing law in a new
way because novel circumstances necessitate evolution is something that
trial courts do daily. This characterization has important implications for
the range of actions that regulators can take without going back to
Congress. One reason to delegate lawmaking to regulatory bodies is
to give technocratic bodies the authority to update the law in a
timely fashion when industry-specific developments so warrant.39 When
agencies are instead changing the law in a fundamental way, this is the
type of action that merits Congressional attention.40
The aim here is not to suggest that the baseline used for legal
purposes is the right baseline for policy purposes; it often is not. Rather
the point is to emphasize the importance of the baseline issue.
39
40

See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 864–66 (1984).
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231–32 (1994).
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Underlying these distinctions is a normative assumption that rule
changes merit broad-based engagement and debate; application of
established principles to new circumstances does not. To put this
distinction into practice, however, requires a common understanding of
when the law is changing. In Mahoney’s account, the Gramm–Leach–
Bliley Act contributed little to the recent crisis precisely because the
divide separating investment and commercial banking had eroded long
before its passage.41 Rather than resolving the truth (or error) in the
deregulation hypothesis, his careful analysis brings to the fore the
importance of understanding the nature of the original balance struck in
Glass–Steagall and the myriad actions that led to its demise. If earlier
decisions were in fact critical in undermining the balance embodied in
Glass–Steagall, this begs the question of why there was not more
democratic engagement in those decisions.
To return to the opening framing of the issue, inherent in the debate
about deregulation are very different understandings of which actions
are protecting the status quo and which actions are changing it. Those
who take a more expansive view of the role of deregulation in leading to
the crisis often implicitly ground their analysis in a broader
understanding of the range of regulatory actions and inactions that were
in fact deregulatory. These different views can largely be attributed to
different understandings of the nature of the original regulatory scheme
and what it means to alter or preserve it in the face of changing
circumstances.
The reason neither position is fully satisfying is that there is no single
right answer to this quandary. The changed circumstances that are center
stage in Mahoney’s account precluded replicating the previous
protections granted to banks without simultaneously implementing a far
more repressive financial regime. Decisions had to be made one way or
the other. To do nothing would have been a choice to allow the regime
to erode, but to defend the regime would also have required new
judgments. We have no good paradigm for understanding how the law
should evolve, or what the process for evolution ought to look like,
when the law itself has helped spur the dynamism now demanding a
response and the multifactor balance the law previously embodied
cannot be replicated in the new environment.

41

Mahoney, supra note 1, at 238, 259–62.
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III. RULES AND THE REASONS FOR THEM
Having established why the baseline matters and why it is so difficult
to establish in the face of change, the question is where do we go from
here. If the question at issue was merely one of statutory interpretation,
rather than how best to regulate finance, we would have familiar frames
in which to ground our analysis, from purposivism to textualism. At the
other end of the spectrum, if we resided in an economist’s dream world,
we might have perfect alignment between policy aims and tools, with no
overlap or deficiencies, and at least one tool for each aim.42 But we
cannot construct reality to fit models any more than we can use purely
legalistic thinking to answer pressing policy questions.
The reasons for most laws are numerous, and this is no less true in
finance. Moreover, because of the inherent endogeneity between the
legal regime and the financial system that emerges from it,43 and the
inevitably incomplete information that shapes policy decisions in this
domain, rationales too can evolve over time. Again, the Glass–Steagall
separation between investment and commercial banking is illustrative.
One view, reflected in the work by Gorton, is that in protecting banks
from both external competition and vigorous competition with each
other, the regime made bank charters valuable and thus made bank
managers and shareholders more risk averse.44 Few think this could be
readily recreated today. Other rationales have also been questioned. For
example, a core concern animating Senator Carter Glass was that
conflicts of interests would cause commercial banks to underwrite lowquality securities, a proposition challenged by subsequent empirical
work on the activities of universal banks prior to the passage of the
Glass–Steagall Act.45
Nonetheless, the debate about whether to use structural separations to
limit the scope of banks remains alive and well. This is both because the
aims the structural separation was meant to achieve were diverse and
because that separation proved to have benefits (and costs) beyond those
envisioned by its promoters. According to Professor Adam Levitin, for
example, the “unintended genius of Glass-Steagall” was that in “splitting
42

See Jan Tinbergen, On the Theory of Economic Policy 1–5, 27–32 (1952).
Pistor, supra note 12, at 315; Gordon & Judge, supra note 2, at 2.
44
Gorton, supra note 18, at 27–28.
45
Randall S. Kroszner & Raghuram G. Rajan, Is the Glass-Steagall Act Justified? A Study
of the U.S. Experience with Universal Banking Before 1933, 84 Amer. Econ. Rev. 810, 810
(1994) (citing other sources expressing similar viewpoints).
43

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

2018]

Regulation and Deregulation

113

up the financial services industry into commercial banks, investment
banks, and insurance companies, Glass-Steagall broke up the political
power of the financial services industry.”46 What Levitin’s frame
highlights is that once we recognize financial markets and regulation to
both be inherently dynamic, setting up a structure that allows for a fair
fight among informed and well-financed participants may be the best
way to ensure the system will continue to evolve in ways that are not
overly beholden to any one of these groups.
Others have similarly suggested that there may have been great
virtues in Glass–Steagall that were not fully apparent until in was gone.
Professor Joseph Stiglitz has argued “[t]he most important consequence
of the repeal of Glass-Steagall was indirect—it lay in the way repeal
changed an entire culture.”47 As he explains it,
[c]ommercial banks are not supposed to be high-risk ventures; they
are supposed to manage other people’s money very conservatively. It
is with this understanding that the government agrees to pick up the
tab should they fail. Investment banks, on the other hand, have
traditionally managed rich people’s money—people who can take
bigger risks in order to get bigger returns. When repeal of GlassSteagall brought investment and commercial banks together, the
investment-bank culture came out on top. There was a demand for the
kind of high returns that could be obtained only through high leverage
and big risktaking.48

In a similar spirit, Professor John Coates has argued that the Volcker
Rule’s49 prohibition on proprietary trading is better understood as a
structural law intended to change the culture of banks than a mere
activities restriction meant to curb risk taking.50
The culture issue is interesting because a wide swath of policymakers
are paying increased attention to the important role that bank culture can
play in the success of any regulatory effort, whether aimed at stability or

46
Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial
Politics: A Review Essay, 127 Harv. L. Rev. 1991, 2060–61 (2014) (reviewing several books
about the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008).
47
Stiglitz, supra note 3.
48
Id.
49
12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2012).
50
John C. Coates IV, The Volcker Rule as Structural Law: Implications for Cost-Benefit
Analysis and Administrative Law, 10 Cap. Markets L.J. 447, 453–58 (2015).

COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION

114

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 104:101

consumer protection.51 Nonetheless, culture is difficult to regulate
directly. As Professor Larry Lessig long ago highlighted, social
meanings are constructed, dynamic, and shaped by law, but that does not
mean lawmakers have the power to dictate or control social meaning.52
When seeking to alter the social meaning of a behavior (or the culture
that permeates an institution), lawmakers will often have to think
creatively and expansively about the interventions most likely to bring
about the desired effect.
Whether Glass–Steagall should be reinstated is beyond the scope of
this Essay, just as it is outside Mahoney’s critique of the deregulatory
hypothesis. Like Mahoney, I am skeptical that reinstituting a hard
separation between banks and investment banks is the best path forward.
But that view is tangential to my analysis, as it is to his. The core point
here is to acknowledge the difficulty of updating any balance struck at a
particular point in time, under particular circumstances. New
developments may well cast doubt on the original rationales or
undermine the capacity of chosen tools to accomplish desired aims, but
they can also yield new insights into the benefits of particular types of
interventions.
IV. LOOKING AHEAD
The analysis here may seem to do little more than problematize any
effort to sort out a root cause of the financial crisis. But, in muddling
through the shortcomings of both the deregulatory narrative and
Mahoney’s rebuttal, and in exploring the mismatch between the
dynamism inherent in finance and a legal system that tends to focus on
form over context, the analysis also lays the groundwork for addressing
these procedural shortcomings.
At the core, the baseline problem reveals the need for a more robust
and ongoing discussion about the myriad aims a regulatory regime is
designed to further and the various mechanisms through which it is
expected to further those aims. Absent a static environment, a legal
51

William C. Dudley, President and Chief Executive Officer, N.Y. Fed. Res. Bank.,
Remarks at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce: The Importance of Incentives in Ensuring a
Resilient and Robust Financial System (Mar. 26, 2018) (transcript available at
https://perma.cc/FHM6-GVQ7); David Zaring, The International Campaign to Create Ethical
Bankers, 3 J. Fin. Reg. 187, 187–190 (2017).
52
Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 943, 957–58
(1995).
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scheme will change in substance even if not in form. This means that
even inaction can be deregulatory. A flipside is that actions that appear
to be regulatory, in the sense of imposing new or heightened obligations
on parties or by nominally expanding restrictions, may in substance be
doing little more than updating the form of the regime to maintain the
original balance struck. As reflected in the discussion of the Glass–
Steagall divide between banks and investment banks, experience may
reveal both advantages and disadvantages that could not have been
known in advance. But as that discussion further reveals, there is no
built-in mechanism for assessing such benefits and drawbacks other than
moments when there are proposals to change the form of the law. This is
reflected in the fact that most of commentators singing the praises of the
unexpected benefits were doing so only after the crisis, but it also comes
through in the slow degradation of the Glass–Steagall divide in the
decade prior to the passage of Gramm–Leach–Bliley. The analysis here
thus suggests the value of institutionalizing review of how a particular
regime is working and the changes that may be undermining or
enhancing its efficacy without waiting for a crisis or a major legislative
change to prompt consideration.
The analysis here also has important implications for the scope of
such review. The discussion of culture, for example, demonstrates not
only the importance of ongoing learning, but also the value of thinking
creatively about the relationship between means and ends. Currently, at
the one point when rigorous assessment is often formalized—the
adoption or modification of a regulation—the analysis is often cramped
into a cost-benefit analysis that is not only speculative but requires these
types of dynamics to be collapsed into a paradigm ill suited to reveal
what is at stake.53 A far more expansive approach is needed.
The analysis also provides yet another reminder of the challenges that
arise from the financial regulatory architecture in the United States. In
an environment where a decision by a market regulator can have firstorder implications on the viability of banks under the purview of
prudential regulators, there is a need for alternative institutions or
mechanisms that can take a more global view. The Financial Stability
Oversight Council and the Office of Financial Research, both still
relative newcomers to the stage, are theoretically well positioned to play
53
John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and
Implications, 124 Yale L.J. 882, 885–89 (2015); Gordon, supra note 12.
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this type of role.54 They cannot do so, however, without broad support
and leadership from a Treasury secretary who recognizes the need for an
expansive lens when assessing the relationships among innovation, legal
change, and aims like systemic resilience.55
Clarifying aims and their relationship to tools is not meant here to
serve as a straitjacket. Lawmaking is a messy process and efforts to
flatten multifaceted regimes into two dimensions are destined to elide
core tradeoffs. It instead can serve as a prism to shape ongoing learning,
encouraging rigorous analysis of whether a law is achieving its intended
aims and the tradeoffs at stake in using a particular tool. The aim here is
to enable a richer and more multidimensional learning process than a
tool like cost-benefit analysis can provide. And it draws attention to the
need for rigorous examinations to occur more frequently, and with
broader input across the regulatory spectrum.
The effort to try to clarify and refine understandings of what a
regulatory regime is meant to achieve and how it is meant to achieve
that aim could help to address the core tensions in the ongoing debate
about the deregulation hypothesis. Even when contested and plural,
these frames can serve as the elusive baseline needed to understand
whether a changed environment in fact caused a finely wrought balance
to shift, and it can help to inform how policymakers should respond
given such developments. Although laying out the details for how to
institutionalize these types of changes is beyond the scope of this Essay,
Mahoney’s thoughtful Article serves as a wonderful prompt for
examining the significant shortcomings of the current regime and the
value of doing better.
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Financial Stability Oversight Council has a clear statutory mandate that creates for the first
time collective accountability for identifying risks and responding to emerging threats to
financial stability.”); Office of Financial Research, About the OFR, https://perma.cc/DBB9G7BH. (“The Office of Financial Research (OFR) helps to promote financial stability by
looking across the financial system to measure and analyze risks, perform essential research,
and collect and standardize financial data.”).
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There are reasons to suspect that the current administration is not setting these bodies up
to fulfill their more ambitious mandates. See, e.g., Rebecca Savransky, Trump Slashing
Staff, Budget at Office of Financial Research: Report, The Hill (Dec. 6, 2017 9:00 AM),
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CONCLUSION
Ultimately, Professor Mahoney’s critique of the deregulation
hypothesis works, even if not quite in the way he intends. In his
willingness to both grapple with detail and take a big-picture view,
Mahoney provides the material needed to understand why any effort to
paint the crisis as solely the product of regulation, deregulation,
innovation, or changing macroeconomic conditions is going to elide
other critical elements. In financial markets and financial regulation,
these forces are constantly feeding on and shaping each other. It is these
interactions that produce, reproduce, and change the financial system.
For regulation to succeed, it must embrace and build on an
understanding of the richness of these dynamics.

